

Ethical and social aspects of policy

Ethical Aspects of the Slovak Army's Participation in Foreign Missions

Key words: ethics – army – missions – security – conflict – war

Introduction

Membership of the Slovak Republic in organization like European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty organization (NATO), which was reached in 2004, is estimated as a fulfilment of its foreign and security policy priorities and interests. Everyone understood such development as an acknowledgment of the end of the internal democratic transformation after collapse of communist regime and consolidation of democracy in 90ties. At the same time, however, such membership brought several essential and controversial challenges to Slovak foreign policy. Slovak Republic had to join bilateral and multilateral activities of both organizations while it was needed to seek an answer to a basic question – what EU and NATO Slovakia wants. To where Slovakia wants to belong within those structures and what kind of capabilities and capacities would use by that.

Security Policy of the Slovak republic

The government of the Slovak republic adopted two important documents shortly after joining both strategic international organizations – Security strategy of the Slovak republic 2005 and Defence Strategy of the Slovak republic 2005. Both documents introduce security environment and security interests of the Slovakia and moreover, Defence Strategy speaks about development of the Armed forces and their use.

Concerning the security environment, it is clear that Slovak republic is a part of the Euro Atlantic region by its location, history, culture, political and economic ties. The geographical position of Slovakia in central Europe predetermines its security policy as well as its security risks. At the present moment we can conclude that Slovakia as such is not threatened by any imminent extensive conventional military risk, nor neighbouring state. Military threats as such decrease in this region. On the other hand non-military threats such as

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, regional conflicts, organized crime, and growing potential for the misuse of cybernetic space, radical ideologies, and unsolved disputes combined with the effects of globalization, demographic development, migration, ecological changes, further state acquisition of nuclear weapons and tensions over the struggle for vital resources increase and they are not risky just for Slovakia. These threats cause instability, uncertainty and unpredictability of international regime which can lead to unexpected crisis situation.

Through the membership in the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO and EU Slovakia and Slovak armed forces contribute to the efforts of whole community to preserve peace and security in the world. With NATO membership Slovakia gained the collective defence guarantee by allied commitments. With EU membership it gained the possibility to formulate, implement and strengthen European security and defence policy. Therefore Slovakia is directly involved in the decision-making processes on world security what increases level of its own security guarantees.

Such position in international security environment corresponds with security interests which Security Strategy defines as guaranteeing the security of citizens and protecting their human rights and fundamental freedoms; guaranteeing territorial integrity, sovereignty, inviolability of borders, political independence and identity; developing democracy, rule of law and market economy; creating prerequisites for sustainable economic, social, environmental and cultural development of society; strengthening strategic partnership and co-guaranteeing the security of the allies; improving effectiveness of international organizations where Slovakia is a member; supporting EU and NATO enlargement; developing partnership relations and all forms of mutually beneficial cooperation with countries with which Slovakia has common interests; contributing to strengthening and expanding freedom and democracy, respect for human rights, rule of law, peace and stability in the world (Security strategy, p. 2).

The key objective of the security policy is to guarantee the security of a state and its citizens in a stable and predictable security environment. It has to protect, promote, safeguard, defend and assert security interests of Slovakia and it is based on several principles, such as:

- Right to an individual and collective self-defence
- Indivisibility of security
- Solidarity and engagement

- Prevention of potential threats and conflicts
- Preference for peaceful means of conflict resolution
- Effective functioning of the system of international standards
- Coordination of common actions of the international community
- Comprehensive approach to ensure security of citizens and of the state
- The use of all available national and international instruments and means in conformity with its legal system and commitments
- Credibility of the state in the system of international relations and security
- Information and active participation of citizens (Security strategy, p. 7).

There can't be forget one another important principle which is a flexible respond to the changing security threats and challenges.

The most important component of such policy is security system which consists of multi-faceted complex comprising foreign policy, economics, defence, internal security, social, rescue and environmental instruments and their mutual links. The prerequisite to it and to its management, construction, functioning and development is effective and functioning legislative, executive a judiciary. Whole security system has to have a capacity to secure an uniform system of management in all crisis situation, identify emerging crisis situations and carry out early warning. It has to analyse the impact of a crisis situation on the security interests of Slovakia and propose the necessary steps which have to be taken in order to face the situation most effectively, prevent the emergence of crisis situations and – if they arise – eliminate them right at the outset, respond to the most probable risks, make adjustments in the light of changes in the security situation, including response to unexpected threats, secure rapid elimination of the consequences of a crisis and restore the initial conditions and ensure continuity of the state's functioning (Security strategy, p. 8).

To traditional instruments of security policy we can assign foreign service and armed forces, intelligent services and armed security corps such as police corps, railway police, corps of prison and court guard, security corps such as customs administration corps, rescue corps and rescue services such as fire and rescue service, mining rescue service, mountain rescue service or medical emergency services, economic mobilisation entities, entities operating on the financial market and the institution responsible for classified data protection. Other important instruments include international and regional institutions and associations, non-governmental organizations international agreements, conventions, treaties, norms and

standards and the media. There has not to be forgotten international law and its contractual and political commitments (Security strategy, p. 8).

Concerning the defence, its basic goal is to provide security for citizens and to guarantee defence of the state with reliance on its own forces and the possibility of collective defence, active participation in promoting peace and stability in the world, prevention of conflicts and settling of crisis situations according to international law and confidence building measures. Principles which apply to it are:

- The sovereign right to guarantee its own security
- Preference for peaceful conflict resolution
- Concord between state defence, law and international obligations of the state
- Civil management and democratic control of the armed forces
- Prevention and deterrence
- Complexity, effectiveness, involvement, adequacy and transparency (Defence strategy, p. 4).

Defence strategy speaks about several missions of defence from which it is needed to underline the involvement in crisis prevention and conflict settlement, flexible respond, preventive measures against crisis and conflict development (Defence strategy, p. 5-6).

In 2013 Slovak government approved the White Paper on Defence of the Slovak republic. This document contains a summary of the current situation analysis of the defence and defines the basic politico-strategic framework of a long-lasting development of the state defence potential with the emphasis put on the armed forces. The strategic aspect, the principal aim of the defence policy of the SR and the transformation aim of the armed forces remain unchanged. The strategy divides the further development into two phases. In the first phase i.e. by the end of the year 2015, the emphasis is laid on the stabilization of the situation preserving the current spectrum of the capabilities. In the second phase at the beginning of the year 2016, a more dynamic development based on a progressive modification of the main types of the weaponry and techniques are expected. The proposed solutions have to comply with the economic reality. Through a consistent implementation of the solutions, the negative trends have to be precluded and the development of the armed forces has to be initiated. This document is aimed to create conditions for a gradual strengthening of the defence capability of Slovakia, enhancing the input to the collective defence and carrying out other international commitments in the area of defence (White Paper on Defence of the Slovak Republic).

The main tool for ensuring and performing security interests and security policy of a state is army. Armed forces of the Slovak republic were established by the NR SR Act No. 3/1993 Coll. on the Establishment of the SR Army as amended. Since 1 January 1993 the SR Army is established and its command and control bodies were formed. The NR SR Act No. 321/2002 on the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic modified from 1 July 2002 the position of basic components of the SR Armed Forces as a decisive executive element of the Slovak defence system, their tasks, use, command, control, inspection, mobilisation and preparation. The SR Armed Forces have the following tasks:

To guarantee

- Defence of the Slovak Republic a security of the State before external armed attack by foreign power,
- Fulfilment of commitments resulting from international treaties binding for the Slovak Republic,

To participate in

- Maintenance of public order and security of the State,
- Maintenance of sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of the SR borders¹.

The fundamental mission and duty of the Armed Forces is to be involved in fulfilment of tasks in crisis or emergency when lives and health of people or property are threatened and by disaster relief. Within the provision of humanitarian aid and within military exercises their mission is also to fulfil tasks outside of Slovak territory if such duty and task results from the binding international treaty commitments. The Armed Forces may be used for:

- Protection of the SR state border,
- Protection and defence of constructions and buildings defined by the SR Government decision as facilities of special importance or other facilities important for State defence,
- Disaster relief after crisis of emergency and for the solution of extraordinary events,
- Struggle against terrorism,
- Search for aircraft and rescue of human lives,
- Ensuring the air traffic of officials appointed by the Government,
- Ensuring the air medical transport².

1 See: Ministry of Defence: The Armed forces of the Slovak republic [online] <http://www.mod.gov.sk/the-armed-forces-of-the-slovak-republic/>

2 See: Ministry of Defence: The Armed forces of the Slovak republic [online] <http://www.mod.gov.sk/the-armed-forces-of-the-slovak-republic/>

But their strategic tasks are as follows:

- To defend state sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of its borders against any armed aggression and to contribute to the collective defence of NATO member states
- To protect air space inviolability and to fulfil tasks in the system of collective protection of NATO common air space
- To admit allied and coalition forces in its own territory and to support over flights, transits in the assigned areas and multinational operations and exercises conducted on the territory of Slovakia
- To contribute to a wide spectrum of NATO or EU led operations carried out without geographical limitation, participation in UN or OSCE led peace support operations, humanitarian support and assistance in crisis situation out of Slovakia,
- To develop the international cooperation and support of Slovak efforts in the area of arms control and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
- To carry out strategic intelligence and to identify threats and their agents in a timely and exact fashion
- To provide geographical, topological, meteorological and other strategically important support services
- To maintain stationary and mobile communication and information system
- To defend and protect defence infrastructure, especially objects of extraordinary and acknowledged importance
- To plan and execute mobilization (Defence strategy, p. 8).

No doubt, all, mentioned above, can be considered as principles, values and tasks of high moral and ethical justification.

Moral aspects of using the Armed forces

All these above mentioned principles and tasks are legitimate, legal, rational and regular according the principles of international law, rational of the politics and preservation of the vital interests of a state in international relations. They are understandable and useful since they do not intervene and collide with the vital interests and right to live of others states and nations and individuals in international system. If they start to interfere to internal affairs of other states and lives of its citizens the problem of morality, problem of doing right thing

comes into a question. Politics and foreign politics of the state specially, are sensitively tested in this sense. As Noam Chomsky (2007) states:

“In fact, one of the, maybe the most, elementary of moral principles is that of universality, that is, If something's right for me, it's right for you; if it's wrong for you, it's wrong for me... if an action is right (or wrong) for others, it is right (or wrong) for us. Those who do not rise to the minimal moral level of applying to themselves the standards they apply to others—more stringent ones, in fact—plainly cannot be taken seriously when they speak of appropriateness of response; or of right and wrong, good and evil...Any moral code that is even worth looking at has that at its core somehow.” (Schivone, G. M., 2007).

The use of Armed forces as preventive tool or as interventionist tool is tested specially. From the inner context or inner politics, the main goal of Armed forces is to protect. In the context of international law and international relations, it is the intervention, namely humanitarian – as it is called nowadays – which comes into consideration and as such is usually understood to be an exception to the non-intervention principle. It is often understood as illegal and ethically non acceptable. However, the natural law tradition regards international law as less important than the moral imperative to punish wrongs and protect the innocent. The so called “humanitarian” intervention is a product of the duty of beneficence and, more specifically, of the right to use force to protect the innocent. But does the inner force of a state, which primary goal is to protect, possess the right to intervene abroad? And what is the moral basis of military service itself? Is it morally legitimate to willingly assume the obligation to fight and die for one’s country and for some abstract and ideological principles or for selfish individual interests?

Human society often places the concepts of duty and service above self. High and noble ideals have a place in the Armed forces that they have in few other areas of human life. Military service embodies some of the deepest values of human life and society, and it produces character that inspires admiration and respect. But while producing excellence of character and virtue, the military exists to serve the will of the political leadership of a particular state. The military will be employed for less-than-grand purposes in the service of that state. If ethics at its highest is about universal human values as equal moral and spiritual value of every human being, how can be this manifested by serving to advance the interests of the very partial human community of a single nation? (Cook, M. L., 2000: 117-129).

It is clear that there is a tension between these highest and universal ethical ideals and the reality that the military serves particular states and their political leaders. If we believe Clausewitz's judgment that war is a continuation of politics by other means, the real purpose

of military leadership is simply to serve the national interest and – sometimes - even selfish political will. Then all the rhetoric about the high moral purposes of military service constitutes a verbal smoke screen behind which lurks an unpleasant truth. It is functional to persuade individuals to think about military service in such moral terms, but such talk only makes it psychologically easier to evade the true reality that military people and organizations exist solely to serve the tribal interests of the state or particular individual. And since states are engaged in a constant struggle to advance their interests and to diminish those of other states, there is little here to be seen as truly morally grand.

Of course, there is the idea of the "self-defence" of the state. But what does it mean? The core meaning of "self-defence" is when we fend off someone who is attacking us personally or, extended to the state, when we resist a border incursion or protect the lives of fellow citizens in peril. But it requires considerable conceptual sleight-of-hand to extend the concept of self-defence to foreign interventions - whether humanitarian or imperial - and to “balance of power” wars. Only rarely do militaries fight in wars that genuinely defend national political sovereignty and territorial integrity. Typically almost all wars of our times served to something considerably broader and vaguer than strict self-defence, something expressed in terms of national interests or important national values (Cook, M. L., 2000: 117-129).

In many parts of the world can be seen that the boundaries of states poorly correspond to people's senses of identity and belonging. Whether we are talking about failed states, or "tribes with flags" that are the reality in much of the world, the nation-state, founded on the civic equality of all citizens, is a recent and regionally specific invention of Europe. In such a way understood concept of state with right to territorial integrity and political sovereignty, and the evolution of a world system taking that form of organization as fundamental, can be seen as an attempt to give a moral shape and definition to the realities of post-Reformation Europe exhausted itself in the religious wars following the Reformation. Illusion of unified Christian Empire was replaced by the new Westphalian international system, in which religion was no longer the determinant of alliances or granting or withholding citizenship or war but arrangement of nation-states with differing religious systems and new rules of the game that the internal matters of states were their own business. This is the origin of the present modern international system in which political sovereignty and territorial integrity of states are the highest values. The whole body of international law is founded on the idea of the sovereign state as an entity closely analogous to a free individual, able to do as he or she sees fit in matters that affect only individual welfare. Each free individual is at liberty to pursue the life and beliefs that seem to him or her most likely to lead to happiness, free from

the interference of others. The *jus ad bellum* – the reason for war – is newly defined in a terms of the defence based on principles of territorial integrity and political sovereignty of states. In this context, the military service and military itself gains new conceptual and more realistic framework too. Soldier is not fighting for God or universal humanity but is defending a particular political and social order in the face of threats to it by other militaries in the service of other states. New universal axiom of international order became a concept of that all states have equal moral claims to territorial integrity and political sovereignty. Each state has the right to be free of aggression by others and to use its military in defence of those rights (Cook, M. L., 2000: 117-129).

Concerning the morality in military, European Westphalian international system sees military officers as moral equals, regardless of the state they serve. All military officers are morally equal members of the profession of arms which moral demands are great but yet delimited. The soldier is obliged to serve the state with integrity and to conduct military operations in a professional manner, disciplining subordinates and ensuring that they conduct themselves within the bounds of the laws and customs of war. But it is not their moral responsibility to assess the moral worth of the state itself. Neither are they obliged to determine the justice of the war the state orders unless there is a compelling reason to do so. (Cook, M. L., 2000: 117-129).

To do so, to fight in defence of particular states interests requires a strong case to be made for it. Michael Walzer (1977) tries to work out why national loyalties should matter to people. According to him it is true that existing states and their boundaries result from entirely irrational patterns of arbitrary map-making and histories of conquest but in so called “good” states the nations with its twin rights of territorial integrity and political sovereignty creates a space where group of people can effort to work out a “common life”, with common symbols, shared memory, shared suffering, defeat and victory, history and culture built up over time together. Common life is a condition for human welfare. Protection then covers “*not only the lives and liberties of individuals but also their shared life and liberty, the independent community they have made, for which individuals are sometimes sacrificed*” (Waltzer, M., 1977: 54).

His idea of common life provides a language to try to articulate why it matters to be an American or Japanese or an Egyptian or a Slovak, over and above the good of individual survival. It helps articulate what a well-grounded and honest patriotic feeling is about. The foundation of this idea of a common life is applicable to every society possessed of sufficient historical continuity through time. If the moral basis of states is that they create and maintain

the space within which a common life can flourish, it is obvious that states succeed in doing this to widely varying degrees. Walzer (1977) states that *“the moral standing of any particular state depends upon the reality of the common life it protects and the extent to which the sacrifices required by that protection are willingly accepted and thought worthwhile. If no common life exists, or if the state doesn't defend the common life that does exist, its own defence may have no moral justification* (Waltzer, M., 1977: 54). Following this argument we can say that the defence of a state rests on a universal foundation. It gives states the benefit of the doubt and assumes that they really do sustain the common life and welfare of their citizens. In Westphalian sense it is about the defence of the common life of the nation and in the sense of universalism it goes about transcendent moral and political values. To sum up we can point out that security interests and security policy of Slovakia as stated in above-mentioned documents complies with both concepts.

Slovak Armed forces in foreign missions

Contemporary conflicts are a complex fragment of reality and are characterised by their high degree of irregularity. This is a consequence of changes in the perception of the security paradigm and in the perception of the impact of security on different areas of life such as society, economic, culture, policy, and environment. War is anything but certain, because of its human and political nature. There are three kinds of war or conflict and crisis situation to which state and international society has to respond in 21st century: interstate, intrastate and conflict combining the features of both of this kind of war and, moreover, we have to take into account natural disasters, and the opposed actions which are directed to prevent and respond to them. Today, we are mainly dealing with an intrastate conflict characterised by:

- Civil conflict which often involves more than two identifiable groups in conflict; by definition, an internationalised civil war involves more than two actors.
- Beyond the difficulty of aggregating multiple preferences in support of a peace operation, the geographic requirements are different in a civil conflict than in an interstate one. Civil instability may mean that several groups are operating in different parts of the country. This could necessitate that the peace operation covers a broader territory, opening up the possibility of more violent incidents.
- Civil conflict may be quite dangerous to a peace force, and the situation more difficult to control, because arms are likely to be in the hands of groups who may be unskilled in their use, lack tight discipline, and probably engage in guerrilla tactics. Light arms are

also likely to be kept in individual homes, and may be widely distributed. These conditions expose the peacekeepers to sniper fire and other problems, as well as making it virtually impossible to secure a given area fully (Diehl, P. F., 2008: 135).

Above mentioned and discussed moral and ethical principles of military and self defence defined in Westphalian sense do not perfectly fit to present definition of conflicts and respond to them. In such conflicts the crisis response operations (CRO) – military and non-military action - are used out of the usual territory of a nation state. These action, led usually by UN or NATO cooperated with other international organisations as political, humanitarian and economic for the prevention of, reaction to and removing effects of a situation striking the territorial integrity, the political independence and the safety of the Member States of NATO and NATO as an organisation and in case of an armed attack on one of the Member States, can be divided into crisis response operations in accordance with article 5 of North Atlantic Treaty and Non-article 5 crisis response operations (NA5CRO). The largest group of these operations is peace support operations, which are divided into conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacemaking and peace building (Ivančík, R. – Jurčák, V., 2013). The operational deployment is different in a different phase of conflict while there are four phases of conflict: (1) before the escalation of conflict, (2) the escalation of conflict, (3) the post-cease-fire and (4) after the disputants has signed the peace agreement. CROs have usually huge problems with its preparation and conduct during the second phase of conflict – the escalation. In this phase they are preparing and conducting peace enforcement operations. But they are most effective in the fourth conflict phase, after the both sides of conflict have signed a peace agreement and the force is charged with assisting in the implementation of that agreement. Peace operations are generally given credit for conflict abatement in a post-cease-fire, pre-settlement phase (Denysiuk, I. - Osypowicz, M., 2014: 45-59).

The involvement of third party states may have a positive or negative impact on the success of the activities carried out by multinational forces. The negative impact of neighbours may lead to an escalation of conflict and in that situation this may cause difficulties for the military contingents. A positive impact may depend on using one of the prevention options against a country engulfed by conflict and, consequently, this can accelerate the peace negotiations. The major powers have a special position in the group of third party states, which include both military and economic development countries. These countries have the military potential to create their own multinational forces and moreover they are dominant players in international economic organisations such as The World Bank or International Monetary Fund the tasks of which are to ensure global economic security and

prosperity. Moreover, to third party actors belong different subnational groups including ethnic groups, competing political movements, and terrorist organisations. The behaviour of these groups can be especially important when peace forces are thrust into areas of international instability and it is the subnational actors who affect peace operations primarily by direct actions of support or opposition (Denysiuk, I. - Osypowicz, M., 2014 : 45-59).

The above mentioned circumstances are more consequences of deployment of multinational forces and international community to the conflict resolution. What is hidden here is a question of moral aspects of such external intervention into domestic affairs of a state. If we take into consideration what was already said about modern Westphalian international system, such external intervention has to be condemned as a violent invasion into internal affairs and enforcement of own selfish interests – often economic. According the modern understanding of concept of state, every state has equal moral right to territorial integrity and political sovereignty. In this context can be then every international intervention seen as moral obligation and has moral justification? Is not just engaging the international community in various regional conflicts the great root cause of increasing violence and the effects of various terrorist organizations in outbreaks of conflict? And do not serve small states like Slovakia in multinational missions under the logo of collective defence rather to the national and economic interests of big states and large transnational corporations as to the idea of defence of universal human values behind which the particular humanitarian intervention and preventive actions are hiding?

To the main components of Slovak foreign and security policy belongs active participation of Slovak Armed forces in international crisis management operations to support and promote peace in conflict resolution, world security and the fight against terrorism. Slovak Armed forces as a part of collective defence and member of international community can actively participate in humanitarian relief operations, observer missions, military exercise or international commitments. Currently, Slovakia officially participates in six operations from which maybe most controversial and longest is International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, so called ISAF operation³.

ISAF was formed under UN Security Council Resolution 1386 of 20 December 2001 and its initial mission was to create secure environment in the capital of Afghanistan, Kabul. In August 2003, NATO assumed the leadership of the ISAF operation and in October 2003, the

³ Slovak army participates in two operations under the leadership of NATO – ISAF in Afghanistan and within NATO Headquarters Sarajevo in Bosnia and Herzegovina; the two operations and missions led by the EU - EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina and EUMM in Georgia, as well as two UN missions - UNFICYP in Cyprus and Monitoring Mission UNTSO in Israel, and Syria.

UN Security Council extended the ISAF's mandate to allow the operation to gradually cover the whole of Afghanistan which was done in four stages to the north, west, south and east of the country from December 2003 to October 2006. The expansion was achieved primarily through Province Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) whose role was to extend responsibilities of the Afghanistan Central Government and to support security and development of Afghanistan. Besides the military efforts, ISAF logo was used to support political processes aimed at putting Afghanistan on the path of stability and development. At the 2010 NATO Lisbon summit held in 19-20 November 2010, NATO Heads of States and Governments agreed to start transition of security situation responsibility – so called transition process - in Afghanistan to the Afghan Government. The joint draft concept of responsibility transition was officially confirmed by the Afghan Government and the International Community at Kabul Conference in July 2010. The transition process had to have five stages and it had to be completed in 2013. At the 2012 NATO Chicago summit on 20 May 2012, NATO Heads of States and Governments adopted the NATO Strategic Plan for Afghanistan which defines the way ahead for the operation ISAF until 2014 and further NATO's engagement in Afghanistan beyond 2014. NATO now sets plans for a new non-combat operation in Afghanistan beyond 2014 which will focus on training, assisting and advising the Afghan Government, including the Afghan National Security Forces. Slovakia joined efforts towards stabilisation in Afghanistan in 2002 by sending an engineer unit to the Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. The 40-member engineer airfield reconstruction platoon performed its tasks from October 2002 at Bagram airport. The Slovak Republic reinforced the participation of the Armed Forces of the SR (AFSR) in Afghanistan by sending a 16-member demining unit to the International Airport Kabul (KAIA) and 1 officer to the KAIA HQ. Unlike the former one, the unit was mandated for the Operation ISAF. In October 2006, both units were merged into one under a new name Multifunctional Engineer Unit) and stationed at KAIA. From March to May 2007, the unit was relocated to the airport in Kandahar where it stayed until the end of 2012⁴. The further participation of Slovak army in the work activities of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) began in May 2007, when 1 CIMIC officer was assigned to the Hungarian PRT in Pol-e-Khomri, Baghlan Province, and in August 2007, he was followed by an operation control officer. In March 2008, the officers also joined the Dutch PRT at Tarin Kowt Base in Uruzgan Province. Their mandate for the mission in PRT Pol-e-Khomri ended in March 2009 but PRT Tarin Kowt continues their activities up to now. In 2008, Slovakia

⁴ Mandate of this mission ended by the resolution of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No. 117/2012 of 24 July 2012.

sent a seven member medical team of the Armed Forces to the operation ISAF, for two rotations. The team cooperated with Czech colleagues in Czech field hospital at the International Airport in Kabul (KAIA). In 2009, a smaller three member medical team was deployed to ISAF, for one rotation lasting from July to December. Slovak broader participation gradually increased in 2008 when there was sent out the first Force Protection Unit, made up of 50 troops, to protect the Tarin Kowt base in Uruzgan Province. Later in December 2008, another 50-member Force Protection Unit was sent to Kandahar Airfield (KAF) in Kandahar, and in 2009, the unit was reinforced with 11 soldiers. The third Force Protection Unit of the Slovak Republic was sent to Afghanistan in March 2009 to protect the Deh Rawood base in Uruzgan. To be able to perform more demanding tasks in the Kandahar base, a new 57-member Force Protection Unit was sent to KAF in April 2010. In September 2010, the Force Protection Unit in the Deh Rawood base ceased its activities and its members were relocated to the base in Kandahar. The Force Protection Unit in KAF now numbers 165 troops. The Force Protection Unit in the Tarin Kowt Base ceased its activities in December 2012 under the terms of the resolution of the National Council No. 117/2012 of 24 July 2012. In 2008, Slovak contingent also participated in the training of the Afghan National Security Forces by sending instructors to the Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLT) in Tarin Kowt. During 2011 the mandate number in the OMLTs was increased by 15 members. In June 2011, as a successor to Australia, Slovak mission assumed responsibility for autonomous CSS OMLT (Combat Service Support OMLT) in Tarin Kowt. In September 2012, a new capability was added to the OMLT: D-30 Howitzer training and repairs. The OMLT in Tarin Kowt was deployed to this assignment. In July 2012, the OMLT was transformed into a Military Advisory Team (MAT), and since then on, Slovak units have also been referred to as CSS MAT and CSS MAT D-30. Owing to the growing number of Slovak troops in the operation, it was necessary to ensure their comprehensive support. For this reason, the National Support Element was sent to the operation where it has been active since September 2008. The presence of the Slovak units has been gradually reinforced even in the ISAF headquarters where Slovak officers can directly participate in decision making on the ISAF's way ahead. The number of the Slovak officers in the headquarters was gradually in line with the growing force of the Slovak contingent increased up to the current number of 19 officers of the Slovak Army. In December 2010 there was send the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team made up of four members into ISAF to deal with the unexploded ordnance and improvised explosive device. In September 2011 in order to become more actively involved, Slovak Army sent the Special Operations Tactics Unit (SOTU) team to

Afghanistan. The members of the 5th Special Forces Regiment from Žilina are tasked with training and mentoring the special units of the Afghan National Police⁵.

All these positive facts conceal the bitter taste in the form of casualties as dead soldiers and doubts whether the whole operation served to a moral objective of human life defence. Also funding the contributions remains to be a problem to some extent because the possible deployment is covered on an ad hoc basis from defence budget and often at the expense of development and training. Another problem was a deployment of predominantly inorganic units formed by professionals from several units and the character of tasks these units had to fulfil – mostly support, engineering and guarding tasks due to unavailability of the desired range and quality of capabilities.

Nowadays, it is clear that the Afghan mission failed. There was never a coherent, logical strategy for Afghanistan. The nation-building strategy relied on an influx of aid money which created a culture of dependency, aggravated the problem of corruption and bankrolled peacekeeper's foes. NATO or ISAF as such never fully signed on the fight and the civilian surge fizzled out after never really materializing. Afghanistan is becoming a textbook example of where not to do counterinsurgency. The presence of US and allied troops created legions of what David Kilcullen termed "accidental guerrillas". Killing or capturing a lot of them strengthened revenge focused culture and hate. Every significant predominance of the international forces – from superior logistics to awesome firepower – was neutralized by either geographic or political concerns.

Due to all mentioned above, what kind of interests and moral norms does Slovak army defended in the ISAF mission? If we would test just interests and objectives written in both strategic documents, we can conclude that there is not moral justification for participation in such operation. From the geographical point of view Slovakia is not threaten by Afghanistan at all. Not even when we test other points in both documents. Should the vague concept of collective defence become the reason for participation on intervention? Or is justification of such participation just fulfilment of binding international agreements in which Slovakia is a partner?

Conclusion

Active participation of the Slovak Armed Forces in military operations and peacekeeping missions in international crisis management is one of the priorities of the Slovak foreign and security policy. Membership in the European Union, NATO and the UN offered Slovakia

⁵ See official page of Ministry of Defence of Slovak republic,

many benefits, but also the obligations arising from membership. Ambition not just to be a consumer, but also an active contributor to international security, is implemented through military contributions to operations and missions. It has to be an expression of interest to be an active contributor to a global as well as domestic security. The official position of Slovak government states that the involvement into international operations and missions beyond the borders of the state contributes to the security of every citizen of the Slovak Republic and improve the Slovak position in the international community.

Fulfils such improvement of a state position in international environment the objectives of the state and the moral principles of the human society? More and more there are voices telling that international and humanitarian interventions has not real justification neither in international law nor in UN Charter, not to mention the moral aspects. We witness that Security Council has all the time problems to come to a decision when necessary because of the interest of the powers and limiting Westphalian concept of modern state and international system. The question is an acceptance of such system in Islamic and Asian world with different meaning of morality and basic principles too. Where in this situation is a position of state like Slovakia? More often we can hear voices saying that behind the high, abstract, moral justification of international involvement into inner affairs of states are not state interests as such but more often individual, private, selfish, economic interests. The selfish interests of individual or - in present times more often – the interests of inanimate corporation is issued as an interest of a group and for a group labelled as a protection of human rights and fight against terrorism.

References

- BRHLÍKOVÁ, R. (2009): *Európska bezpečnostná a obranná politika a Lisabonská zmluva*. In. *Civitas: časopis pre politické a sociálne vedy*. Roč. 15, č. 37, s. 2-5. ISSN 1335-2652.
- BRHLÍKOVÁ, R. (2012): *Európska únia po Lisabone*. Nitra: UKF, 256 s., ISBN 978-80-558-0172-8.
- DIEHL P. F. (2008): *Peace Operations*. Polity Press, Cambridge.
- IVANČÍK, R. (2009): *Financovanie vojenských operácií Európskej únie v rámci európskej bezpečnostnej a obrannej politiky*. In *Manažment, teória, výučba a prax: zborník príspevkov z medzinárodnej vedecko-odbornej konferencie*. Liptovský Mikuláš: Vojenská akadémia ozbrojených síl generála M. R. Štefánika, s. 126-138. ISBN 978-80-8040-373-7.
- IVANČÍK, R. (2010): *Bojové skupiny – vojenský nástroj krízového manažmentu Európskej únie*. In *Krízový manažment*, roč. 9, č. 2, s. 53-57. ISSN 1336-9202.
- IVANČÍK, R. – JURČÁK, V. (2013): *Mierové operácie vybraných organizácií medzinárodného krízového manažmentu*. Liptovský Mikuláš: Akadémia ozbrojených síl generála M. R. Štefánika, ISBN 978-80-8040-469-7

Konsolidované znenie Zmluvy o Európskej únii a Zmluvy o fungovaní Európskej únie. Charta základných práv Európskej únie. Luxemburg: Úrad pre vydávanie publikácií Európskej únie, 2010, ISBN 978-928242589-3.

WALZER, M. (1977): *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations.* 2d ed.; Basic Books.

The Internet addresses:

COOK, M. L. (2000): *Moral Foundations of Military Service.* From Parameters, Spring, pp. 117-29 [on line 10.3.2014] Available on:

<http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/00spring/cook.htm>

DENYSIUK, I. - OSYPOWICZ, M. (2014): *The essence and assumptions of evaluation of crisis response operations.* Security and defence Quarterly No 1, 2014, pp. 45-59.

Európska služba pre vonkajšiu činnosť. [on line 10.3.2014] Available on:

http://www.eeas.europa.eu/index_sk.htm

MINISTERSTVO OBRANY SR (2005): *Obranná stratégia SR.* [on line 10.3.2014]

Available on: <http://www.mod.gov.sk/data/files/832.pdf>

MINISTERSTVO OBRANY SR (2005): *Bezpečnostná stratégia SR.* [on line 10.3.2014]

Available on: <http://www.mod.gov.sk/data/files/833.pdf>

MINISTERSTVO OBRANY SR (2013): *White Paper on Defence of the Slovak Republic.* [on

line 10.3.2014] Available on: <http://www.mod.gov.sk/white-paper-on-defence-of-the-slovak-republic/>

MINISTERSTVO OBRANY SR: The Armed forces of the Slovak republic [on line 10.3.2014] Available on: <http://www.mod.gov.sk/the-armed-forces-of-the-slovak-republic/>

SOLANA, J. (2003): *A secure Europe in a better world. European security strategy.* [online]

Brussels: December 2003. [on line 10.3.2014] Available on:

<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>

SCHIVONE, G., M. (2007): *On Responsibility, War Guilt and Intellectuals.* Counter Punch.

Interview. [on line 10.3.2014] Available on: <http://www.counterpunch.org/2007/08/03/on-responsibility-war-guilt-and-intellectuals/>

VALASEK, T. - KOEHANE, D. (2008): *Willing and able? EU defence in 2020.* London:

Centre for European Reform, [on line 10.3.2014] Available on:

http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/e_2020_844.pdf